‘Stuff happens’: the risks of a results agenda. Guest post from Rosalind Eyben

blogged about the risks associated with the aid industry’s current overriding obsession with audit/value for money/results (pick your term). Since then, that debate has been swirling around both on this blog Ros Eyben portraitand (more importantly), in aid and development circles in many countries. So to help it along a bit I’ve asked two people who think about this a lot more than I do to set out some competing arguments. First up is Ros Eyben, who got a big and largely positive response to her recent challenge to the dumber/more extreme varieties of value-for-moneyism. Tomorrow the ODI’s Claire Melamed responds. Please join in the debate. “The UK’s development ministry (DFID) has just completed a review of its bilateral aid programme. The Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell has ‘set out the results that UK aid will deliver for the world’s poorest people over the next four years’. DFID will be more ‘hard-headed about making every penny count’. Its press release highlights results such as 11 million more children at school and 50,000 fewer women not dying from having babies. Digging into the review’s report, you will find numbers relating to DFID’s other aims, including wealth creation and tackling the root causes of conflict. Here, DFID is more modest: 50 million people with the means to help work their way out of poverty, rather than creating millions more jobs as some enthusiastic DFID country offices apparently offered to achieve. How can a government (let alone a foreign aid agency) deliver jobs? Likewise, DFID is not going to reduce the number of conflicts in the world but instead help citizens hold their governments more accountable. When we look at the details, DFID’s plans seem pretty sensible. But the press release worries me. Explaining to the British public how UK aid delivers value for money – promising to educate more children than those we educate in the UK, but at 2.5% of the cost – must surely influence how DFID thinks and works. I am in charge of redecorating our bathroom while my partner is away. The paint is peeling and there is mildew on the ceiling above the shower. To demonstrate I got value for our money I will get two quotations for the redecoration. Many donor governments are treating the complex problems of poverty like my bathroom. They contract a Third Party Operator to deliver a result pre-determined by DFID. At the end of three or four years, there is an evaluation to check on results before paying the contractor. Sometimes DFID’s bounded problem-approach to change (as typified by the logical framework) is going to work. But there are major concerns about the institutional and financial sustainability once the intervention ends, if these have not been addressed as an integral part of the design. By 2006 the global polio vaccination campaign had successfully eradicated polio from all but four countries, yet by 2008 it had reappeared in nineteen additional countries. In the drive for results, insufficient attention had been paid to the national health systems needed to keep polio at bay. To be able to count exactly how each penny or Euro of aid money gets spent, donor governments are risking not making any difference at all. They can show how many kilometres of roads they have built or numbers of babies vaccinated as compared with before they started the projects. But such facts reveal little about how the change was achieved and what can be learnt for future policy and practice. End-of-project evaluations are no substitute for continuous learning and adaptation of approach. Donors are ignoring lessons long since learnt: without local people empowering themselves to change those less tangible factors that cannot be counted, once donor money stops the roads will crumble away and the next generation of babies will not be vaccinated. These inadequate measures of assessment – and the effect of such measures on the design of aid – risks donor governments wasting, instead of securing ‘value for money’. dilbert auditing Eventual outcomes are often very different from what the logical framework required. Stuff happens. Power, history and culture shape the multiplicity of relationships and actors influencing any aid intervention. It makes more sense to design aid to recognize this. Experienced staff and consultants know it. But they are being forced to misrepresent reality in order to keep things simple for the taxpayer. They have to work with complex problems – such as why maternal mortality rates refuse to go down – as if they were bounded problems like my mildewed bathroom. In a largely unpredictable and dynamic environment, rather than choosing a single ‘best option’, a more value-for-money might be achieved by financing two or more different approaches to solving a complex problem, facilitating variously-positioned actors to implement an intervention according to their different theories of change and diagnoses and consequent purposes. Aid bureaucracies have never recognised that effective aid depends on people and the quality of their relationships with each other. Sheela Patel of SPARC, an Indian NGO that supports slum dwellers federations has written that when SPARC was founded in 1984 ‘ Donors gave money to us because there was a sense of trust. These funders did not set our priorities; communities of poor people did….. we were given all the space we needed. Consequently, SPARC and its partners now operate in nine states of India and help some 750,000 households….. I cannot imagine donors in today’s world granting an organization like SPARC the kind of latitude it required in its early years. Instead,[they] have become more focused on developing portfolios of projects, managing risks, and producing outcomes rather than on listening to communities, healing deep inequities, and supporting innovation’. The origins of the results agenda lies in a mistrust that eats like a cancer into aid agencies’ capacity to make a difference. I am not convinced the emphasis on results will solve the problem of trust. On the contrary, it risks making things worse. The results rhetoric gets exaggerated by bureaucratic systems and by those middle level managers with little country level experience who are forcing grantees and development partners into straitjackets that constrain them from helping transform the lives of people in poverty. We aid practitioners must start building trust. Steps in the right direction include paying attention to the inequitable power relations, including our own behaviour, which keep people in poverty; being modest about what any purposeful intervention can achieve; and communicating simply with taxpayers about complex realities. Rosalind Eyben is a Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies and former Chief Social Development Adviser at DFID.]]>

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8 Responses to “‘Stuff happens’: the risks of a results agenda. Guest post from Rosalind Eyben”
  1. As H-J chang argued, development today is Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Well maybe not so, but DFID’s new course could be Hamlet chasing after small princes.
    (Sorry, I’ve never studied or read Hamlet).

  2. Great piece, Duncan.I look forward to seeing Claire Melamed’s response, though I have long lent towards Ms. Eyben’s view.
    I believe in using a host of information to assess how we’re working and using it all to make new plans. The problem isn’t the obsession with ‘results’. We should be looking for better results. The problem is in the bounded way we conceive and measure what results and failure are, our response to them, and the ways in which our modern conceptions of results modify our own behaviour.

  3. Alice Evans

    How do you address the source of this problem? Communicating to taxpayers that DfID is getting value for money/ doing it’s best in a context of complex realities?
    There are similar issues in budget support. From conversations with senior donor staff and government representatives in Zambia, I understand that many are fearful to reduce their micro-management of funds, for fear of corruption, which would incense their taxpayers. Most seem well aware of critical literature which warns that this approach does not build government capacity, but short-termists fears of scandal looms large.

  4. Fascinating. Reminds of me of recent speech by retiring GCE President Kailash Satyarthi, who asked GCE members ‘What if Nelson Mandela had been asked to present the struggle for South Africa’s freedom in a logframe?’ Kailash intended it as a reminder of the value of activism, but it could just as easily be a rejoinder to the current obsession with results from bilaterals and philanthropists alike.

  5. Shupiwe

    Great debate here. Just great.
    It is a great read that makes you smile at the idiosyncrasies of the Aid business, wonder at the never-ending continued dichotomisation of development and it makes you want to attend a live debate with both authors (with yourself Duncan as the best qualified moderator on this fiery topic!)
    Leaving beside the idea of a live debate on this topic, which I am sure IDS could include into their seminar sessions, the debate seems to have ignored a section of players in the game – business.
    It is unsurprising for example, that numerous business relationships were made public when the Middle East revolution began and that these relationships were often driven by European governments and in some cases European Royalty. It would be very surprising if the very same relationships did not exist as the primary working relationship with most developing countries.
    I cannot be as eloquent as the Claire and Rosalind but I wonder if it is possible to measure power and trust relations within development without including the role of business (it’s impact on the economy, it’s relation with government, and it’s corruption of government officials) and with that of course, the role of government.
    And a final Ps – the anti trust game is well and truly live. I was present at a meeting with an Australian NGO and an Australian funder to discuss work in Papua New Guinea amongst other places and was shocked and insulted to hear that the funder was glad to be working in partnership with this Australian NGO as it meant that “they had a white man or woman to ensure their funds were spent in the right places.” With ingrained racist attitudes like this, unfortunately I think it will be a long time before the results focus will change.